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Why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) distinguish between chavalah of animals versus humans? The shiur develops that chavalah has two Torah (תורה) sources: animals follow mafarik from the Mishkan (requiring tzorech ledam), while humans follow a separate din from milah (where the act of removal itself is the melacha). This resolves major contradictions in the Gemara (גמרא) and Rambam.
This shiur addresses fundamental contradictions in understanding chavalah (wounding) on Shabbos (שבת), particularly the Chasam Sofer and Minchas Chinuch's questions about the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos discusses whether one is liable when blood is mifkad pakid (ready to emerge) versus chaburi mechaber (attached/integrated). This appears to contradict the general principle that for mafarik (separating), one is liable when extracting something mifkad pakid (like squeezing grapes or olives for their liquid). Rabbi Zweig presents an innovative resolution based on the Rambam's distinction between chavalah of animals versus humans. He argues that chavalah has two separate Torah (תורה) sources and therefore two different halachic frameworks. For animals, chavalah follows the standard mafarik derived from the Mishkan's melachos, specifically as a subcategory of dosh (threshing). This requires tzorech ledam (a use for the blood extracted) and follows the normal rules where mifkad pakid creates liability.
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Kesubos 5b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
