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Why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) distinguish between chavalah of animals versus humans? The shiur develops that chavalah has two Torah (תורה) sources: animals follow mafarik from the Mishkan (requiring tzorech ledam), while humans follow a separate din from milah (where the act of removal itself is the melacha). This resolves major contradictions in the Gemara (גמרא) and Rambam.
This shiur addresses fundamental contradictions in understanding chavalah (wounding) on Shabbos (שבת), particularly the Chasam Sofer and Minchas Chinuch's questions about the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos discusses whether one is liable when blood is mifkad pakid (ready to emerge) versus chaburi mechaber (attached/integrated). This appears to contradict the general principle that for mafarik (separating), one is liable when extracting something mifkad pakid (like squeezing grapes or olives for their liquid). Rabbi Zweig presents an innovative resolution based on the Rambam's distinction between chavalah of animals versus humans. He argues that chavalah has two separate Torah (תורה) sources and therefore two different halachic frameworks. For animals, chavalah follows the standard mafarik derived from the Mishkan's melachos, specifically as a subcategory of dosh (threshing). This requires tzorech ledam (a use for the blood extracted) and follows the normal rules where mifkad pakid creates liability.
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Kesubos 5b
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
