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What does the principle "ein onus b'gittin" mean? The shiur explores whether onus requires active resistance (yesh taina onus) and develops the distinction between objective inability versus subjective intent. The analysis shows that in conditional gittin, the real issue isn't physical coming but the husband's underlying desire to divorce.
This shiur analyzes the Talmudic principle of "ein onus b'gittin" (there is no coercion in divorce) from Kesubos 2b, focusing on the requirement of "yesh taina onus" (there must be a claim of coercion). The discussion begins with Rashi (רש"י)'s position that onus requires not just objective inability but also subjective resistance - one must actively claim they were coerced and didn't want to perform the act. This is contrasted with cases where someone has no choice but still desires the outcome. The shiur develops a fundamental distinction in understanding conditional gittin. When a husband says "this is a get if I don't come within twelve months," the question arises: is this about the physical act of coming/not coming, or about his underlying intent regarding the divorce? Rabbi Zweig argues that the true issue is the husband's desire - whether he wants to give the get or retract it, with coming/not coming serving merely as evidence of his intent.
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Kesubos 2b
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