No community start suggestion yet.
When a wife claims she was raped after erusin and the husband says "lo ki," is he making a bari claim requiring her to swear, or just expressing disbelief (shema)? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s apparent contradiction between different halachos reveals a fundamental distinction: shevuas eses is only required when the opposing party has direct knowledge of facts, not merely when he considers the claimant untrustworthy.
The shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 12b dealing with a case where a woman claims she was raped after erusin (betrothal) but before nisuin (marriage), and her husband responds "lo ki" (it is not so). The central question revolves around whether this constitutes a bari (definitive claim) versus a shema (uncertainty), and the resulting implications for monetary obligations and the requirement for shevuas eses (oath of those who take). Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation presents difficulties, as does the Tosafos (תוספות) position that "lo ki" doesn't necessarily indicate certainty. The Rambam (רמב"ם) presents what appears to be contradictory rulings: in one place requiring shevuas eses for collection, and in another place not requiring it. This seeming contradiction extends to a comparison with Halacha (הלכה) Tet-Zayin, where a woman claiming to be a besula (virgin) when the husband claims to have found her a beula (non-virgin) must swear to collect the tosefes kesuva.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 12b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
