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When a wife claims she was raped after erusin and the husband says "lo ki," is he making a bari claim requiring her to swear, or just expressing disbelief (shema)? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s apparent contradiction between different halachos reveals a fundamental distinction: shevuas eses is only required when the opposing party has direct knowledge of facts, not merely when he considers the claimant untrustworthy.
The shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 12b dealing with a case where a woman claims she was raped after erusin (betrothal) but before nisuin (marriage), and her husband responds "lo ki" (it is not so). The central question revolves around whether this constitutes a bari (definitive claim) versus a shema (uncertainty), and the resulting implications for monetary obligations and the requirement for shevuas eses (oath of those who take). Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation presents difficulties, as does the Tosafos (תוספות) position that "lo ki" doesn't necessarily indicate certainty. The Rambam (רמב"ם) presents what appears to be contradictory rulings: in one place requiring shevuas eses for collection, and in another place not requiring it. This seeming contradiction extends to a comparison with Halacha (הלכה) Tet-Zayin, where a woman claiming to be a besula (virgin) when the husband claims to have found her a beula (non-virgin) must swear to collect the tosefes kesuva.
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Kesubos 12b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
