A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
What does Ben Azai's principle of mahalech komed domi (walking is like stopping) mean for Shabbos (שבת) carrying liability? Tosafot reads this as each step creating an actual hanacha, while the Rif sees it as mere presence without hanacha. The analysis reveals how these different understandings of akira and hanacha reshape the fundamental nature of the melacha of hotza'ah.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a fundamental dispute in Shabbos (שבת) law between Ben Azai and the Chachamim regarding the principle of mahalech komed domi (walking is like stopping). The discussion centers on Masechta Shabbos 5b and explores how this principle affects liability for carrying between domains on Shabbos. The shiur examines different interpretations of this principle by major Rishonim, particularly Tosafot and the Rif. According to Tosafot, Ben Azai holds that when someone walks while carrying an object, each step constitutes an actual hanacha (placing down), making them liable if they subsequently decide to carry the object out. The Rif, however, interprets mahalech komed domi differently - as merely indicating presence at a location without constituting an actual hanacha. The shiur explores how this dispute relates to the halacha (הלכה) Moshe miSinai of carrying four amos in reshus harabim, examining why Ben Azai's position doesn't contradict this established law. The analysis delves into fundamental questions about what constitutes akira (picking up) and hanacha (putting down) in Shabbos law, and whether the melacha of hotza'ah is defined by crossing boundaries between domains or by the physical act of carrying. The discussion includes analysis of related sugyot in Masechta Ketubot regarding theft and Shabbos violation, showing how these principles apply in complex scenarios. Throughout, the shiur demonstrates how different conceptual approaches to the nature of domain change (shinui reshuyot) lead to practical halachic differences in determining liability for Shabbos violations.
Shabbos 5b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Up Next in this Series
How can Shabbos observance atone for the idolatry of Enosh's generation? The Rambam's reading shows that generation sought God through physical intermediaries rather than direct connection. Proper Shabbos observance creates authentic divine experience that naturally displaces attraction to spiritual substitutes - like tasting real coffee exposes ersatz as meaningless.
Why does the Gemara say one Shabbos protects from Amalek while two Shabboses bring redemption? The shiur applies a principle from Kiddushin about repetition changing psychology: the first time doing anything is experimental, but the second demonstrates genuine desire. True Shabbos connection with Hashem requires moving beyond spiritual curiosity to authentic internalization.
Why does the Gemara pray to be 'among those who eat three meals on Shabbos' rather than simply to fulfill the mitzvah? The shiur develops that Shabbos eating means 'tasting the day itself' - mindful appreciation that connects us to Shabbos's spiritual quality. This requires discipline and community support, with three meals corresponding to distinct phases of Shabbos time.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
