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Why does Kiddushin say we're only Hashem (ה׳)'s children when we "act like children"? The shiur develops that we possess a chelek Elokai mima—a Divine essence—but only when we actively bring it out through compassion and kindness (מה הוא אף אתה). Unlike a biological son, spiritual sonship depends on emulating Hashem's qualities; only children receive His treasure, the Torah (תורה) itself.
This shiur explores the deep philosophical question of what it means for Klal Yisrael to be called Hashem (ה׳)'s children. Beginning with Parshas Beshalach and Rashi (רש"י)'s mashal of the son riding on his father's shoulders who then asks a stranger, "Have you seen my father?"—which leads to Amalek's attack—Rabbi Zweig asks: What creates the reality of being Hashem's children? The Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin presents a fundamental dispute. Rabbi Yehuda holds that "בנים אתם לה'" applies only when Klal Yisrael acts like children (נוהג מנהג בנים); when they don't, they aren't children. Rav Meir maintains they are always called children, even when described as "בנים לא אמון בם" (children without faith) or "בנים משחיתים" (corrupted children). The question is sharp: Unlike biological sonship, which doesn't depend on behavior, why would spiritual sonship hinge on conduct?
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Kiddushin (implied from discussion of Rav Meir and Rav Yehuda's dispute)
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