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Why doesn't the universal principle of oines rachmana patra apply to gittin? The shiur examines whether oines in conditional gittin means involuntary inaction (rendering the condition unfulfilled) or inability to express one's true will. Rashi (רש"י)'s approach that "yesh tanis oines" - one must claim the compulsion - reframes oines as affecting proof rather than the underlying obligation.
The shiur begins by examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s question about why the principle of oines (compulsion) that applies to iggis man (divorce refusal) doesn't automatically apply to gittin. Rabbi Zweig notes that since oines rachmana patra is a universal Torah (תורה) principle, the Gemara could have asked this question anywhere, yet it specifically references the earlier case. This suggests the din of oines in gittin is somehow connected to that specific precedent rather than being a universal application. A fundamental problem emerges from Rashi (רש"י)'s position that one must "taina oines" (claim the compulsion) for it to be effective. In the earlier case of iggis man, no such requirement appears - if someone becomes ill and cannot give a get, that's simply oines. How can the gittin case be "locked into" that earlier din if it has an additional requirement that wasn't present originally?
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Kesubos 2b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
