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Why doesn't the universal principle of oines rachmana patra apply to gittin? The shiur examines whether oines in conditional gittin means involuntary inaction (rendering the condition unfulfilled) or inability to express one's true will. Rashi (רש"י)'s approach that "yesh tanis oines" - one must claim the compulsion - reframes oines as affecting proof rather than the underlying obligation.
The shiur begins by examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s question about why the principle of oines (compulsion) that applies to iggis man (divorce refusal) doesn't automatically apply to gittin. Rabbi Zweig notes that since oines rachmana patra is a universal Torah (תורה) principle, the Gemara could have asked this question anywhere, yet it specifically references the earlier case. This suggests the din of oines in gittin is somehow connected to that specific precedent rather than being a universal application. A fundamental problem emerges from Rashi (רש"י)'s position that one must "taina oines" (claim the compulsion) for it to be effective. In the earlier case of iggis man, no such requirement appears - if someone becomes ill and cannot give a get, that's simply oines. How can the gittin case be "locked into" that earlier din if it has an additional requirement that wasn't present originally?
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Kesubos 2b
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