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Does a married woman who commits adultery become prohibited to her husband through one halachic mechanism or two? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between cases requiring eidei kiyum (formal witnesses) that invalidate the marriage itself, versus cases creating a prohibition on the woman without formal testimony. This framework resolves contradictions between various Acharonim.
This shiur analyzes an intricate sugya in Kesubos 9a dealing with when a married woman becomes prohibited to her husband after adultery. Rabbi Zweig begins by noting the complexity of this topic and the apparent contradictions found among the Gedolei Acharonim. The Gemara (גמרא) presents Rav Elazar's statement that a woman who says 'pesach (פסח) pasuach matzasi' (I found an opening) becomes prohibited to her husband based on a double doubt (sfeik sfeika) - she could be either a kohen's wife violated by a non-kohen, or an Israelite's wife who willingly committed adultery. The Gemara raises a contradiction from another statement of Rav Elazar that a woman only becomes prohibited through kinui v'stirah (warning and seclusion), yet here there is no such formal process. Rabbi Zweig examines two major approaches: Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that the requirement of kinui v'stirah is based on the husband's concern (kipeid de'baal), and Tosafos (תוספות)' view that formal witnesses (eidim) are always required for prohibiting a woman to her husband, just as witnesses are needed for kiddushin.
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Kesubos 9a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
