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Does a married woman who commits adultery become prohibited to her husband through one halachic mechanism or two? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between cases requiring eidei kiyum (formal witnesses) that invalidate the marriage itself, versus cases creating a prohibition on the woman without formal testimony. This framework resolves contradictions between various Acharonim.
This shiur analyzes an intricate sugya in Kesubos 9a dealing with when a married woman becomes prohibited to her husband after adultery. Rabbi Zweig begins by noting the complexity of this topic and the apparent contradictions found among the Gedolei Acharonim. The Gemara (גמרא) presents Rav Elazar's statement that a woman who says 'pesach (פסח) pasuach matzasi' (I found an opening) becomes prohibited to her husband based on a double doubt (sfeik sfeika) - she could be either a kohen's wife violated by a non-kohen, or an Israelite's wife who willingly committed adultery. The Gemara raises a contradiction from another statement of Rav Elazar that a woman only becomes prohibited through kinui v'stirah (warning and seclusion), yet here there is no such formal process. Rabbi Zweig examines two major approaches: Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that the requirement of kinui v'stirah is based on the husband's concern (kipeid de'baal), and Tosafos (תוספות)' view that formal witnesses (eidim) are always required for prohibiting a woman to her husband, just as witnesses are needed for kiddushin.
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Kesubos 9a
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