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Why are certain melachos permitted on Yom Tov even when not done for ochel nefesh? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s principle of mitoch - that melachos permitted for ochel nefesh may also be done for other needs. A fundamental dispute emerges between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding whether any tzorech is required or not at all.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Kesubos 7a dealing with the halachic principle of mitoch regarding melachos on Yom Tov. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses when melachos that are normally permitted for ochel nefesh (food preparation) may be performed for other purposes. The discussion begins with the laws of havurah (making fire/burning) on Shabbos (שבת) versus Yom Tov, where Rav Papa states that havurah is forbidden on Shabbos but permitted on Yom Tov because of the principle mitoch she-hutrah l'tzorech, hutrah nami shelo l'tzorech - since it was permitted for necessity, it was also permitted not for necessity. The Gemara then raises challenges to this principle, questioning why mugmar (burning incense) should be forbidden if mitoch applies broadly. A fundamental machloket emerges regarding the scope of this principle. Rashi (רש"י) appears to hold that melachos permitted for ochel nefesh are mutar even completely shelo l'tzorech - without any need whatsoever. Tosafos (תוספות) disagrees, arguing that some form of tzorech is still required, though not necessarily tzorech ochel nefesh. The sugya also discusses whether the item must be something that is sharei l'chol nefesh (suitable for everyone) or merely needs some form of personal tzorech. The Gemara brings the case of hunting deer (tzvi) as an example - since not everyone eats venison, is this considered ochel nefesh? The shiur explores whether the issue is availability, preference, or something else entirely. A particularly complex issue arises regarding bia (marital relations) and whether extinguishing lights for this purpose should be permitted under mitoch. Tosafos provides two approaches: first, that tzorech mitzvah (מצוה) (the need to perform a mitzvah) can justify actions under mitoch; second, that only bia rishona (the first time for a couple) has special status. This raises broader questions about when mitzvah performance can justify melachos on Yom Tov, with implications for cases like milah and other religious obligations. The analysis reveals deep questions about the nature of the mitoch principle and its practical applications in Yom Tov observance.
Kesubos 7a
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