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Does the obligation to provide a kesubah begin at erusin or nisuin? The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds it's d'oraisa from nisuin based on 'k'mohar habesulos,' creating a fundamental distinction between the obligation to marry (from kiddushin) and the obligation to pay (from nisuin). This resolves the classic question of why 'misheirastani nenasti' isn't considered a mekach ta'os.
This shiur addresses fundamental questions about the nature and timing of kesubah obligations according to the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position. The central challenge comes from Tosafos (תוספות) Rid and Rabbeinu Chananel who argue that our sugya must hold that kesubah obligations begin from erusin, because otherwise a case of 'misheirastani nenasti' (I was raped after you betrothed me) would constitute a mekach ta'os (mistaken transaction). Since the Rambam rules that kesubah obligations only begin at nisuin, this creates a significant difficulty. Rabbi Zweig develops a novel approach based on the Rambam's understanding that there are two distinct types of kesubah obligations: one d'oraisa and one d'rabbanan. The d'oraisa obligation stems from the pasuk 'k'mohar habesulos' and applies to cases like a mefutah (seduced woman) who must receive kesubah like other besulos. This obligation is designed to create permanence in marriage that extends beyond the husband's lifetime - essentially making marriage more than just a temporary arrangement.
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Kesubos 12b
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