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Why doesn't the Gemara (גמרא) answer the question of 'vlidros onishori' with karka olam instead of beis beheimah? The shiur analyzes the dispute between Rabbeinu Tam and the Rivam over when karka olam serves as an exemption - whether it applies to giluy arayos, chillul Hashem (ה׳), or both.
The shiur examines a complex Tosfos on Kesubos 3b dealing with the principle of karka olam (passive participation) and its application to different categories of forbidden acts. The Gemara (גמרא) presents the question 'vlidros onishori' - suggesting that a woman should be forced into degrading situations rather than change the takanas chachamim about wedding timing. Rabbi Zweig analyzes how different Rishonim resolve this difficulty. The core dispute centers on Rabbeinu Tam versus the Rivam regarding when karka olam exempts from the obligation of yeharag v'al ya'avor (martyrdom). According to Rav Kivaiger's reading, Rabbeinu Tam holds that karka olam works for chillul Hashem (ה׳) but not for giluy arayos, while the Rivam holds the opposite - that it clearly applies to giluy arayos but is a chiddush for chillul Hashem.
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Kesubos 3b
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