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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) rule differently when a groom can't marry due to sickness versus takanas Rabanan? The Maharsha argues that takanos for the bride's benefit don't excuse payment of mezonos, while those for the groom's benefit do. The Gemara's two approaches—onas versus "lo higiyah zeman"—yield different practical outcomes for determining when payment obligations begin.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos examining when a groom's inability to marry on the designated day exempts him from paying mezonos (support). The discussion centers on the Maharsha's fundamental principle that the nature of the impediment determines the obligation. The Maharsha establishes that when takanos chachamim prevent marriage for the bride's benefit (like shok tu - waiting three days), the groom remains obligated in mezonos because he is considered an onas (unavoidably prevented). However, when the impediment serves the groom's benefit (like tnius basulam - virginity concerns), he is not obligated because it's not classified as true onas.
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Kesubos 2a-2b
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