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Why was Moshe's son Eliezer endangered at the inn when his bris was delayed? The shiur argues that an uncircumcised son disqualified the father from spiritual perfection necessary for prophecy—or even from being part of the Geulah itself. Just as such a father cannot eat Korban Pesach (פסח), Moshe could not serve as the Goel Yisrael without his son's circumcision, making the bris essential for the entire redemption.
The shiur opens with a fundamental question in the Gemara (גמרא): when Moshe Rabbeinu delayed circumcising his son at the inn on the way to Egypt, who was in mortal danger—Moshe himself or his son Eliezer? There is a dispute among Tanaim. While the opinion that Moshe was in danger is understandable as a punishment for negligence, the opinion that the child would be killed is puzzling. Why would the child die for something that was not his fault? Rabbi Zweig offers a fundamental answer rooted in the spiritual mechanics of redemption and prophecy. Moshe had been appointed to return to Egypt and lead the Jewish people out of bondage. To fulfill this mission, Moshe needed ongoing prophecy from Hashem (ה׳)—constant divine communication as events unfolded. However, there is a halachic principle that a father whose son is uncircumcised cannot eat the Korban Pesach (פסח), even if the father himself is circumcised and even if he was an ones (circumstances beyond his control prevented the circumcision). This reveals that having an uncircumcised son creates a spiritual deficiency in the father—a lack of connection to Hashem severe enough to disqualify him from the Korban Pesach.
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Nedarim 31b-32a (regarding who was in danger at the inn)
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