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Must one relight Chanukah (חנוכה) candles that go out, and does this apply to all candles or just the basic mitzvah (מצוה)? Rashi (רש"י)'s analysis suggests the obligation to relight applies only to the essential ner ish u'beiso, not to additional mehadrin candles. This distinction explains why one becomes a "poshea" for neglecting the core mitzvah but bears no such responsibility for mehadrin enhancements.
This shiur analyzes Shabbos (שבת) 21a's discussion of the obligation to relight Chanukah (חנוכה) candles that go out (kav sha zakuk la). Rabbi Zweig explores Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary on the phrase "kav sha ner Chanukah" and its implications for our understanding of the mitzvah (מצוה)'s requirements. The analysis begins with the fundamental question of whether the obligation to relight applies only to the basic mitzvah of lighting one candle or extends to the mehadrin practice of lighting multiple candles. Rashi's position that one who fails to relight becomes a "poshea" (negligent) raises significant questions about the nature of this obligation. The shiur examines whether using oils that might go out constitutes negligence from the outset, given that one might not be present to relight them. This leads to a deeper analysis of what constitutes completion of the mitzvah - whether lighting with proper intention suffices, or whether the candle must actually burn for the required duration. The discussion reveals that according to one understanding, if kav sha zakuk la (one must relight if it goes out), then the mitzvah is not complete until the candle burns for the full half-hour, creating an ongoing responsibility.
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Shabbos 21a
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