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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) need se'ah echad to permit machshir mitzvah (מצוה) on Shabbos (שבת) when it could use chol bi'yado l'afkir? Tosafot's question reveals two categories: preparations for mitzvos that are docheh Shabbos become part of the mitzvah itself, while preparations for other mitzvos require a separate pikuach nefesh-type justification.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of Tosafot's complex question in Masechta Shabbos (שבת) regarding machshir mitzvah (מצוה) (preparations for mitzvos) and their relationship to Shabbos observance. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether one can learn from milah (circumcision) that preparations for other mitzvos should also override Shabbos prohibitions. Tosafot raises a fundamental challenge: why does the Gemara need to invoke the principle of se'ah echad (a specific scriptural derivation) when it could simply argue based on chol bi'yado l'afkir (one has it in his power to avoid the situation)? The shiur explores two distinct categories of mitzvos and their machshirim. For mitzvos that are inherently docheh Shabbos (like milah), the preparations become part of the mitzvah itself and are therefore also docheh Shabbos. However, for mitzvos that are not docheh Shabbos (like lulav, shofar, mezuzah, and tzitzis), the preparations can only be justified through a din of pikuach nefesh-type reasoning - the Torah (תורה) wants the result, and therefore permits whatever is necessary to achieve it. The Ran's position is analyzed, arguing that machshir milah is considered part of the milah itself, making it docheh Shabbos. However, this creates a fundamental distinction between different types of mitzvos. Tosafot's question illuminates why the Gemara specifically chose examples of mitzvos that are not inherently docheh Shabbos when discussing machshir mitzvah, as these represent a different halachic category entirely. The shiur concludes by examining practical applications, including the obligation to avoid situations where one might violate Shabbos (chol bi'yado l'afkir) and when this principle applies versus when one is permitted or even required to perform machshir mitzvah on Shabbos.
Shabbos 131a
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