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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) say a minor who was seduced is considered 'forced' (ones) when she seemingly acted willingly? Tosafos (תוספות) holds this creates a double doubt about rebelliousness versus coercion. The Rambam (רמב"ם) resolves this by distinguishing between physical force and intellectual manipulation — a minor can be 'brainwashed' through verbal persuasion, making even apparent consent actually ones.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental machlokes between Tosafos (תוספות) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding the principle of 'piku katana ones' (a seduced minor is considered forced). The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 9a discusses a case where a Jewish woman was married as a minor (under three years old) and later may have been mezana (committed adultery). Since she was under three when married, there was no actual biah, yet she becomes forbidden to her husband due to a safek (doubt) about her later conduct. Rashi (רש"י) explains that she must now be a gedola (adult) for there to be a single safek whether the act was ones or ratzon. If she were still a minor, she would definitely be considered an anusah (forced), eliminating any doubt. Tosafos challenges this, arguing it creates a 'safek safeka' (double doubt): maybe she acted willingly, but even if so, perhaps she was still a minor when it happened, making her an anusah due to 'piku katana ones.'
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Kesubos 9a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
