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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) say a minor who was seduced is considered 'forced' (ones) when she seemingly acted willingly? Tosafos (תוספות) holds this creates a double doubt about rebelliousness versus coercion. The Rambam (רמב"ם) resolves this by distinguishing between physical force and intellectual manipulation — a minor can be 'brainwashed' through verbal persuasion, making even apparent consent actually ones.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental machlokes between Tosafos (תוספות) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding the principle of 'piku katana ones' (a seduced minor is considered forced). The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 9a discusses a case where a Jewish woman was married as a minor (under three years old) and later may have been mezana (committed adultery). Since she was under three when married, there was no actual biah, yet she becomes forbidden to her husband due to a safek (doubt) about her later conduct. Rashi (רש"י) explains that she must now be a gedola (adult) for there to be a single safek whether the act was ones or ratzon. If she were still a minor, she would definitely be considered an anusah (forced), eliminating any doubt. Tosafos challenges this, arguing it creates a 'safek safeka' (double doubt): maybe she acted willingly, but even if so, perhaps she was still a minor when it happened, making her an anusah due to 'piku katana ones.'
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Kesubos 9a
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