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What is the melacha involved when blood is drawn during metzitzah after circumcision? Tosafot argues that drawing out blood for healing constitutes melacha she'ain tzrich l'gufah (work not needed for its essential purpose) since the intent is therapeutic, not to weaken the child. This analysis creates fundamental questions about how we define intent in Shabbos (שבת) melachos.
This shiur analyzes a complex Tosafot on Kesubos 5b dealing with the melacha of drawing blood during metzitzah (the drawing of blood after circumcision). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether this constitutes a violation of Shabbos (שבת) and under what circumstances it would be permitted. Tosafot raises the fundamental question of what melacha is being performed when blood is extracted for therapeutic purposes. The core issue revolves around the concept of melacha she'ain tzrich l'gufah - work performed without needing its essential destructive purpose. According to Tosafot, when metzitzah is performed, the person is not trying to weaken (mechalesh) the child but rather to heal him by removing dangerous blood or improving circulation. Since the intent is therapeutic rather than harmful, this would constitute melacha she'ain tzrich l'gufah, which according to Rabbi Shimon is only a rabbinic prohibition rather than biblical.
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Kesubos 5b
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