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Why wasn't Dovid HaMelech forbidden to marry Batsheva after witnessing her adultery? The shiur develops the machlokes between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) on whether shavi nash chateicha d'isurah qualifies as eidei kium to forbid an eishes ish on the ba'al versus just establishing facts.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 9a dealing with the case of Dovid HaMelech and Batsheva, focusing on the fundamental question of what type of testimony is required to render an eishes ish forbidden to her husband versus forbidden to a ba'al (the adulterer). The Gemara (גמרא)'s underlying tension emerges from an earlier ruling that pesach (פסח) pasucha kishne eidam domi - that witnessing compromising circumstances is equivalent to having two witnesses. This creates a seeming contradiction: if such evidence is sufficient, why wasn't Batsheva forbidden to Dovid after he witnessed her adultery?
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Kesubos 9a
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