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What does b'diavad mean when we rely on a woman's testimony about her child's lineage? Rashi (רש"י) explains that b'diavad refers to the type of psak required - we can be machmir l'chatchila but cannot definitively rule against someone's chazaka. Tosafos (תוספות) disagrees, viewing b'diavad as an emergency situation where normal restrictions are relaxed.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya in Kesubos 14a dealing with the testimony of a woman regarding her child's paternity and the resulting questions of lineage (yuchsin). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where a woman claims her child is from a particular man, and explores when we accept her testimony l'chatchila versus b'diavad. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the basic Gemara text, where there's a dispute about whether we rely on the woman's word when the man is not present to confirm or deny her claim. The Gemara states that even if the man doesn't admit (lo modeh), we can still rely on her testimony b'diavad, leading to questions about what constitutes this b'diavad situation.
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Kesubos 14a
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