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What distinguishes cases where witnesses can defend themselves against zomem accusations versus those where they cannot? The shiur analyzes two scenarios in Makkos 5a through the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s lens. When witnesses fail to clarify unusual circumstances (like superior vision) during original testimony, later explanations are rejected as they violated their duty to specify their position.
The shiur examines two fundamental cases of eidim zomemim presented in Makkos 5a, focusing on when contradicted witnesses can successfully defend themselves and when they cannot. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses witnesses who claim someone committed murder on the east side of a building, only to be contradicted by witnesses saying they were on the west side at that time. A parallel case involves witnesses claiming a murder occurred in one city in the morning, contradicted by witnesses who saw them in another city that evening. The analysis centers on the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation in Hilchos Eidus, particularly his requirement that assumptions about witness capabilities must be both 'matzui' (available/common) and 'yadua' (known). Rabbi Zweig explores why the Rambam adds this 'yadua' requirement and what it reveals about the nature of witness testimony.
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Makkos 5a
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