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When someone falsely claims a ten-year loan is due in thirty days, how much must they pay? The Gemara (גמרא) presents two conflicting opinions on whether shmitah cancels loans not yet due. The shiur analyzes the Rishonim's approaches and explores fundamental questions about the nature of debt obligations.
The shiur analyzes a complex Gemara (גמרא) in Makkos 3a-3b dealing with shmitah's effect on loans and false claims about debt timing. The case involves someone who borrowed money for ten years but falsely claimed it was a thirty-day loan. The Gemara presents two conflicting opinions (lashon rishon and lashon acharon) regarding whether such a person must pay the full amount or only the difference between the ten-year value and thirty-day value. The first opinion holds 'shvitas mishamtaso' - that shmitah cancels the debt, so the borrower only pays the difference. The second opinion holds 'ein shvitas mishamtaso' - shmitah doesn't cancel debts not yet due, requiring full payment. Tosfos explains that we follow the second opinion because the Mishna supports it, as it establishes a general rule rather than limiting it to specific cases like ma'ava al mashkin.
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Makkos 3a-3b
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