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How can a minor convert to Judaism when he lacks the capacity to make such a momentous decision? The shiur analyzes whether conversion is purely beneficial or involves disadvantage, developing the principle that the father's ownership rights enable him to accept the negative aspects while beis din provides beneficial zechia for the child.
This shiur explores one of the most complex sugyos in Kesubos 11a regarding ger katon (minor converts). The fundamental question addressed is how Jewish law permits converting a minor who lacks the mental capacity to understand the significance of such a decision. The Gemara (גמרא) states "ger katon avdo naas beis din" - a minor convert is converted through beis din's agency. Rashi (רש"י) explains that this halacha (הלכה) applies specifically when the child has no father (im ein lo av). When a father is present, the conversion works through different mechanisms. This raises difficult questions: what difference does the father's presence make, and why wouldn't the same logic apply to the mother who is typically closer to the child?
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Kesubos 11a
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