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When a husband says 'this is your get after twelve months if I don't come,' and he fails to come due to circumstances beyond his control, is the get valid? The Gemara (גמרא) debates whether onas (duress/force) applies to gittin, with two possible understandings: either it's about the technical definition of 'not coming' versus being prevented from coming, or it's about the husband's underlying intention to retain decision-making power over the divorce.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 2b regarding the principle of onas (duress) in the context of gittin (divorce documents). The central case involves a husband who gives his wife a conditional get, saying 'this will be your get after twelve months if I don't come,' but then fails to come due to circumstances beyond his control (onas). The Gemara (גמרא) presents a fundamental debate: yesh onas b'gittin (duress applies to gittin) versus ein onas b'gittin (duress doesn't apply to gittin). Rabbi Zweig explores two primary approaches to understanding this dispute. The first approach, attributed to Rav Chaim Brisker, suggests this is a technical halachic question about the nature of actions and non-actions. According to this view, the debate centers on whether being prevented from coming due to onas is considered 'not coming' in a halachic sense. Yesh onas would mean that being forced not to come is not the same as actively choosing not to come, while ein onas would treat any failure to come, regardless of cause, as fulfilling the condition.
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Kesubos 2b
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