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Why aren't false witnesses punished after their testimony leads to actual execution? Rashi (רש"י) explains that kasher zamam v'lo kasher asah means the din transfers from defendant to witness - once the psak is executed, there's nothing left to transfer.
The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation of the principle kasher zamam v'lo kasher asah through a complex reading of Makkos 2b. The Gemara (גמרא) presents two distinct issues regarding false witnesses (eidim zomemim): whether they can be punished for the actual execution (kasher asah) and whether they can still be punished for their original false testimony (kasher zamam) after the execution has occurred. The shiur begins by examining the kal v'chomer argument regarding challah: just as a mechalel cannot become mischalel, surely one who is merely haba l'chalel cannot receive the punishment of challah. However, this seems to contradict the entire institution of eidim zomemim, leading the Gemara to respond with "ein on shemin hadin" - perhaps the punishment needs to be even more severe.
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Makkos 2b
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