A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
What evidence is required to prohibit an adulterous woman to her husband? The shiur analyzes the dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos regarding whether you need eidei kiyum (formal witnesses) versus eidei birur (clarifying witnesses), developing a fundamental distinction between creating a defect in the marriage bond versus merely establishing an issur.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of Kesubos 9a, examining the complex question of what type of testimony is required to prohibit an isha she'zansah (adulterous woman) to her husband. The central dispute revolves around Rashi (רש"י)'s position that formal witnesses (eidei kiyum) are required versus Tosfos' view that clarifying witnesses (eidei birur) suffice. The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion begins with Rav Elazar's statement about pesach (פסח) pasuach (an open entrance) and the question of whether this creates prohibition without proper witness testimony. Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental distinction between two types of prohibition that can affect a woman who commits adultery. The first is a din that creates a pgam (defect) in the ishus (marriage bond) itself, which requires eidei kiyum - just as creating or dissolving a marriage requires formal witnesses. The second is merely an issur dikedushah (prohibition due to sanctity) that affects the woman's status without fundamentally altering the marriage relationship, which only requires eidei birur.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 9a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
