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Why isn't a woman believed regarding paternity when she lived with her arus (betrothed)? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: a woman has ne'emanus to declare her child kosher but lacks any ne'emanus to establish paternity. When saying the child came from her arus, she's establishing paternity, which requires more than her word alone.
This shiur analyzes the complex Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 13b dealing with cases of arus-arusa (betrothed couples) and the woman's believability regarding paternity. The central question revolves around why a woman who lived with her betrothed husband isn't believed when she claims the resulting child is from him, especially given that in other cases the Mishna accepts her word about the child's kosher status. Rabbi Zweig identifies a fundamental distinction that resolves the apparent contradictions in this sugya. He explains that there's a crucial difference between ne'emanus (believability) regarding the child's status versus establishing paternity. A woman has ne'emanus to say her child is kosher - meaning the father was a kosher Jewish man - but she lacks ne'emanus to identify the specific father and establish paternity.
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Kesubos 13b
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