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What constitutes proper intent when removing blood on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s distinction between intending to extract blood versus intending healing effects. Rabbi Zweig questions why the Gemara asks what a person intends rather than prescribing proper intent.
This shiur analyzes Kesubos 5b regarding the permissibility of bloodletting on Shabbos (שבת), focusing on the critical distinction between different types of intent (kavanah). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether one may let blood lechatchila on Shabbos, presenting two possible intents: being miskaven for the blood itself (dam hu tzorech) versus being miskaven for the healing benefit (lepesach hu tzorech). Rabbi Zweig presents a fundamental question about the Gemara's approach. Rather than asking what a person's intent actually is, shouldn't the halacha (הלכה) simply prescribe what intent is permitted? If intending for healing is forbidden while intending for blood extraction is permitted, the halacha should instruct people to have proper intent rather than trying to determine their actual motivation.
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Kesubos 5b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
