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How can the same vegetable (chazeris) serve for both karpas and maror without creating kavana problems? The Gemara (גמרא)'s case reveals that even those who hold mitzvos ain tzrichos kavana agree that wrong intention (kavana farkert) prevents mitzvah (מצוה) fulfillment. This distinction reshapes our understanding of when intention matters in halacha (הלכה).
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of Pesachim 114b, exploring the fundamental question of mitzvos tzrichos kavana (whether mitzvos require intention) through the lens of the Seder's two dippings - karpas and maror. Rabbi Zweig examines two possible interpretations of the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion. The first, simpler reading suggests that when one only has chazeris (horseradish), the first dipping is for maror and the second for heker (distinguishing the night). However, this interpretation creates significant difficulties with the Gemara's subsequent question about why the Mishna didn't teach the normal case first. The shiur develops a more sophisticated reading where the first dipping is specifically l'shem karpas (with intention for karpas) even when using chazeris, while the second dipping fulfills the maror obligation. This approach introduces the concept of kavana farkert (wrong intention) - when one performs an action with intention for something other than the actual mitzvah (מצוה) being performed. This reading suggests that even those who hold mitzvos ain tzrichos kavana (mitzvos don't require intention) would agree that kavana farkert prevents fulfillment of the mitzvah.
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Pesachim 114b
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