No community start suggestion yet.
Does the principle of ones (compulsion) apply to gittin (divorce)? The shiur analyzes whether a husband can claim ones to invalidate a get, exploring the difference between claiming ones versus circumstances creating ones. The key insight involves distinguishing between conditional gets where ones affects the original giving versus revocation of an already-given get.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 2a-b dealing with the principle of "ein ones b'gittin" - whether compulsion (ones) can invalidate a get (divorce document). The discussion centers on cases where a husband gives a conditional get before departing on a journey, specifying it should take effect if he doesn't return within a certain timeframe, but then dies or is prevented from returning due to circumstances beyond his control. Rabbi Zweig explores the fundamental question of what constitutes ones in the context of gittin. The Gemara presents different scenarios: one where the husband says the get should take effect after a certain period, and another where he says it should take effect immediately but gives himself the right to revoke it if he returns. The shiur examines why these cases might have different halachic outcomes despite seemingly similar circumstances.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 2a-b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
