A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
If someone eats maror for karpas and then must eat it again for the mitzvah (מצוה) of maror, when should they make the bracha? The machlokes between Rav Huna and Rav Hisda reveals the fundamental dispute about mitzvos tzrichos kavanah - whether proper intention is required for mitzvah fulfillment.
This shiur provides a detailed analysis of Pesachim 114b, focusing on the fundamental dispute regarding mitzvos tzrichos kavanah (whether mitzvos require proper intention). The discussion centers on a case where one only has maror available for karpas - must they eat it again for the mitzvah (מצוה) of maror after matzah? Rabbi Zweig explains Reish Lakish's position according to the Rashbam: if someone eats maror for karpas before its proper time (which is after matzah, based on the pasuk 'al matzos umorim yochlu'), they would be fulfilling maror prematurely (kodem zman), which is problematic. Therefore, one must hold mitzvos tzrichos kavanah - the first eating counts for nothing since it was done l'sheim karpas, allowing the second eating to properly fulfill the mitzvah l'sheim maror after matzah.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Pesachim 114b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
