No community start suggestion yet.
How can eidim zomemim receive punishments that seem harsher than those who actually commit crimes? The shiur contrasts Tosafos (תוספות) and Rashi (רש"י)'s approaches to resolving this logical difficulty. Tosafos argues that eidim zomemim victimize the judicial system itself, not just the defendant, justifying the seemingly stricter punishment.
The shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Makkos 2b dealing with the fundamental logic behind eidim zomemim (conspiring witnesses) punishments. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a logical challenge: in the real world, one who makes someone a challal (disqualified person) does not himself become a challal. Using this principle, one could argue that in the legal world of eidim zomemim, someone who merely intended to make someone a challal (haba lechalel) certainly shouldn't become a challal either. This logic would seem to undermine the entire institution of eidim zomemim, since the legal reality would be more lenient than actual reality. The shiur explores two major approaches to understanding this difficulty. Tosafos (תוספות) maintains that the Gemara's logic is sound and compelling, but ultimately argues that there's a fundamental misconception in the premise. According to Tosafos, the victim in cases of eidim zomemim is not the defendant who would have been punished, but rather the judicial system itself. When false witnesses corrupt the court proceedings, they are victimizing the beis din and the entire system of justice. This reframes the punishment as addressing the corruption of the judicial process rather than compensating for harm to an individual.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Makkos 2b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
