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How can eidim zomemim receive punishments that seem harsher than those who actually commit crimes? The shiur contrasts Tosafos (תוספות) and Rashi (רש"י)'s approaches to resolving this logical difficulty. Tosafos argues that eidim zomemim victimize the judicial system itself, not just the defendant, justifying the seemingly stricter punishment.
The shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Makkos 2b dealing with the fundamental logic behind eidim zomemim (conspiring witnesses) punishments. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a logical challenge: in the real world, one who makes someone a challal (disqualified person) does not himself become a challal. Using this principle, one could argue that in the legal world of eidim zomemim, someone who merely intended to make someone a challal (haba lechalel) certainly shouldn't become a challal either. This logic would seem to undermine the entire institution of eidim zomemim, since the legal reality would be more lenient than actual reality. The shiur explores two major approaches to understanding this difficulty. Tosafos (תוספות) maintains that the Gemara's logic is sound and compelling, but ultimately argues that there's a fundamental misconception in the premise. According to Tosafos, the victim in cases of eidim zomemim is not the defendant who would have been punished, but rather the judicial system itself. When false witnesses corrupt the court proceedings, they are victimizing the beis din and the entire system of justice. This reframes the punishment as addressing the corruption of the judicial process rather than compensating for harm to an individual.
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Makkos 2b
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