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When is a married woman who commits adultery under coercion forbidden to her husband? The Tosafos (תוספות) analyzes whether the prohibition stems from violating God's command or from betraying the marital relationship itself. This distinction explains the cryptic Gemara (גמרא) about "promiscuous women" and resolves a fundamental dispute between Rabbeinu Tam and the Rivash.
This shiur analyzes a complex passage in Tosafos (תוספות) on Kesubos 3b dealing with the laws governing a married woman who commits adultery under duress (ones). The discussion centers on understanding when such a woman becomes forbidden to her husband and the underlying reasons for this prohibition. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a fundamental question: why does the Gemara in one place only ask about the kashya of "farhesia" (public adultery) and not "gilui arayos" (forbidden relations) when discussing a Jewish woman with a non-Jew? Rabbi Zweig explains that this indicates there may be no inherent prohibition of gilui arayos between a Jewish woman and a non-Jew, leading to a shocking conclusion by some Rishonim that such relations might only be rabbinically forbidden.
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Kesubos 3b
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