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Why is a mother believed to say her child is kosher but not to declare him a mamzer? The shiur develops a complex understanding through the Rav Magid's approach that a safek mamzer has a unique status — mutar midoraisa but aser midrabbanan — making the mother's testimony effective only for removing rabbinic prohibitions, not creating Torah (תורה)-level determinations.
This shiur examines a fundamental question in the laws of mamzerus found on Kesubos 13b: why the halacha (הלכה) accepts a mother's testimony to declare her child kosher, but rejects her testimony to declare the child a mamzer. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that when a mother says "this is Ben Ploni" (naming a kosher father), we believe her to permit the child to marry into Klal Yisrael, but we don't believe her identification of the father for lineage purposes. However, if she identifies a mamzer as the father, she cannot render the child a mamzer. The shiur focuses extensively on the Rav Magid's complex explanation of why this asymmetry exists. According to the Rav Magid, the key lies in understanding the unique status of a safek mamzer. Midoraisa (on a Torah (תורה) level), a safek mamzer is permitted to marry both a bas Yisrael and a mamzeres. The prohibition against a safek mamzer marrying anyone is purely midrabbanan (rabbinic).
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Kesubos 13b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
