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Why is a mother believed to say her child is kosher but not to declare him a mamzer? The shiur develops a complex understanding through the Rav Magid's approach that a safek mamzer has a unique status — mutar midoraisa but aser midrabbanan — making the mother's testimony effective only for removing rabbinic prohibitions, not creating Torah (תורה)-level determinations.
This shiur examines a fundamental question in the laws of mamzerus found on Kesubos 13b: why the halacha (הלכה) accepts a mother's testimony to declare her child kosher, but rejects her testimony to declare the child a mamzer. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that when a mother says "this is Ben Ploni" (naming a kosher father), we believe her to permit the child to marry into Klal Yisrael, but we don't believe her identification of the father for lineage purposes. However, if she identifies a mamzer as the father, she cannot render the child a mamzer. The shiur focuses extensively on the Rav Magid's complex explanation of why this asymmetry exists. According to the Rav Magid, the key lies in understanding the unique status of a safek mamzer. Midoraisa (on a Torah (תורה) level), a safek mamzer is permitted to marry both a bas Yisrael and a mamzeres. The prohibition against a safek mamzer marrying anyone is purely midrabbanan (rabbinic).
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Kesubos 13b
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