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Why does our Gemara (גמרא) permit wounding (chabura) for biah while daf 22b forbids extinguishing a candle for non-food purposes? Tosafot offers two approaches: either biah mitzvah (מצוה) permits even machshir actions, or chabura is actual ochel nefesh melacha while extinguishing is only machshir that requires ochel nefesh justification.
The shiur analyzes a complex Tosafot on Kesubos 7a addressing an apparent contradiction between two Talmudic passages. Our sugya permits chabura (wounding) for biah on Yom Tov, while the Gemara (גמרא) on daf 22b forbids extinguishing a candle (kibui ha-ner) for non-food purposes. Tosafot presents two resolutions to this seeming inconsistency. The first teretz suggests that biah constitutes a mitzvah (מצוה), and for mitzvah purposes, even machshir melachos become permitted. This approach implies that extinguishing a candle is normally forbidden as machshir, but would be allowed for the mitzvah of biah. However, this creates a difficulty since the Gemara on 22b explicitly states that according to Rabbi Yehuda, machshir is permitted, yet still forbids extinguishing the candle there.
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Kesubos 7a
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