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Does each step while walking on Shabbos (שבת) constitute a hanacha for hotza'ah? Ben Azzai holds that walking is like standing, making each step a hanacha, while Chachamim disagree. The shiur analyzes how this machloket affects whether hotza'ah is defined as shinui reshuyos versus carrying, examining cases of nimlaich and mefaneh chefetz.
This advanced Gemara (גמרא) shiur examines a crucial machloket in Masechta Shabbos (שבת) regarding the nature of walking in the context of hotza'ah (carrying) on Shabbos. The central dispute revolves around Ben Azzai's position that 'mahalach ka'omeid domi' (walking is like standing), meaning that each step in walking constitutes a hanacha, versus the Chachamim who hold that walking does not create a hanacha. The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s approach to reconciling this with the principle of ma'avar arba amos b'reshus harabim, questioning how mahalach can be considered a hanacha if it would contradict established halachos. Multiple interpretations are explored, including whether the melacha of hotza is defined as shinui reshuyos (changing domains) versus carrying. The shiur examines cases of mefaneh chefetz mizavas l'zavas (moving an object from one corner to another) and nimlaich (changing one's mind), analyzing whether these constitute akira (lifting) or merely tilcha (taking). Various rishonim are discussed including the Rif, Rambam (רמב"ם), Rashba, and Ramban (רמב"ן), with particular attention to their different understandings of when akira reshuyos (lifting from a domain) occurs. The analysis includes a detailed examination of the Gemara in Kesubos regarding theft and Shabbos violations, and how the timing of these violations relates to the concepts of akira and hanacha. The shiur concludes with a sophisticated analysis of how these principles apply differently according to Ben Azzai versus the Chachamim, particularly regarding the role of omeid l'katef (standing to adjust) versus omeid l'nuach (standing to rest).
Shabbos 5b
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