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Why must one light Chanukah (חנוכה) candles on both sides of their home to avoid suspicion, while someone passing a synagogue during prayers isn't suspected of skipping davening? Persumei nisa creates an actual communal obligation - one owes the miracle's celebration to their neighbors, not just themselves. This transforms Chanukah from personal observance into a debt to create shalom and connection within the broader community.
This shiur analyzes Gemara (גמרא) Shabbos (שבת) 23a regarding the obligation to light Chanukah (חנוכה) candles on both sides of one's home when facing multiple streets. The Gemara states that if people pass by and see no candles, they might suspect the homeowner didn't light at all, creating a din of chashad (suspicion). Rabbi Zweig examines a fundamental question raised by the Beis Yosef: there appears to be a contradiction between different areas of chashad in halacha (הלכה). Regarding davening, if someone walks past a shul during services, they're only forbidden if there's no other entrance - since people will assume they're entering through the other door. But with Chanukah candles, the opposite applies: one must light on both sides specifically because people won't assume the lighting occurred elsewhere.
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Shabbos 23a
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