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Why must one ask mechilah three times, and what is the nature of this requirement? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between mechilah as a favor versus mechilah as rectification of the original wrong. This framework resolves the Maharsha's question and explains why Yosef's brothers' approach through messengers was insufficient.
The shiur examines two fundamental issues from Kesubos 9a, beginning with a detailed analysis of the requirement to ask mechilah (forgiveness) three times. Rabbi Zweig addresses the Maharsha's pointed question: if three times is sufficient, why wouldn't ten times also suffice if the person refuses to grant forgiveness after three attempts? The core insight emerges through a careful reading of the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position on bakashas mechilah (requesting forgiveness). Rabbi Zweig identifies two possible understandings of this requirement: either asking mechilah is requesting a favor from the wronged party to discharge their right over you, or it constitutes the actual repair of the original wrong through the act of humbling oneself. The Rambam's ruling that after three refusals the refusing party becomes the sinner proves that the second understanding is correct - the asking itself fixes the personal put-down that was created by the original wrong.
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Kesubos 9a
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