No community start suggestion yet.
When does personal knowledge surpass testimony? The shiur explores whether Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) disagree fundamentally about the nature of eidus — Rashi seeing it as objective truth that surpasses personal knowledge, while the Rambam views eidus as mere legal presumption (gezerat hakatuv) that personal knowledge can exceed.
The shiur opens with analysis of Kesubos 9a's case of pesach (פסח) pasuach matzosi ("I found her not to be a virgin"), examining Rashi (רש"י)'s puzzling language about the absence of witnesses. Rabbi Zweig suggests that Rashi distinguishes this case from normal eidus because determining virginity requires physical examination, not visual testimony — creating a category outside traditional eidus requirements. The discussion transitions to explore a fundamental machloket between Rashi and the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding the nature of shavya nafshe chatichadi l'isura (one who renders himself liable for prohibition). Rashi appears to view personal admission as inferior to eidus, while the Rambam suggests the opposite. This leads to analysis of the Rambam in Hilchos Ishus where someone claiming to be a kohen receives malkus for living with a divorcee, yet the Rambam doesn't require him to divorce her.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 9a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
