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When does personal knowledge surpass testimony? The shiur explores whether Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) disagree fundamentally about the nature of eidus — Rashi seeing it as objective truth that surpasses personal knowledge, while the Rambam views eidus as mere legal presumption (gezerat hakatuv) that personal knowledge can exceed.
The shiur opens with analysis of Kesubos 9a's case of pesach (פסח) pasuach matzosi ("I found her not to be a virgin"), examining Rashi (רש"י)'s puzzling language about the absence of witnesses. Rabbi Zweig suggests that Rashi distinguishes this case from normal eidus because determining virginity requires physical examination, not visual testimony — creating a category outside traditional eidus requirements. The discussion transitions to explore a fundamental machloket between Rashi and the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding the nature of shavya nafshe chatichadi l'isura (one who renders himself liable for prohibition). Rashi appears to view personal admission as inferior to eidus, while the Rambam suggests the opposite. This leads to analysis of the Rambam in Hilchos Ishus where someone claiming to be a kohen receives malkus for living with a divorcee, yet the Rambam doesn't require him to divorce her.
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Kesubos 9a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
