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Why are we permitted to perform hatafas dam bris on a child born circumcised (nolad mahul), causing pain without removing an orlah? The shiur develops a chakira: regular bris accomplishes two things—removing the orlah (physical correction) and hachnasas habris (covenant membership). When the child is born mahul, only the second remains. The answer: hachnasas habris benefits the child by giving him a father with the mesirus nefesh of Avrohom Avinu—a chinuch advantage that justifies the procedure.
This shiur analyzes a Midrash discussing the halachic status of a child born already circumcised (tinok shenolad mahul). The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that such a child requires hatafas dam bris—drawing a drop of blood as a symbolic act—based on the double language "himol yimol" in the Torah (תורה)'s command regarding milah. The fundamental question the Midrash raises is: "ma hu mutar"—are we permitted to do this? The shiur rejects the Marzoh's explanation that the question concerns whether hatafas dam bris overrides Shabbos (שבת). This interpretation is problematic because the Midrash's language doesn't mention Shabbos, and the Torah already provides a pasuk permitting the procedure. The Radal's approach—changing the text from "mutar" to "chayav"—is also unsatisfying, as it requires altering the established girsa.
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Shabbos 135a-137b (regarding bris milah on Shabbos and the laws of hatafas dam bris)
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