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When is a newborn considered definitively viable for halachic purposes? The shiur analyzes the dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot on Shabbos (שבת) 136a regarding the thirty-day requirement for bar kayama status, showing how their different approaches affect pidyon haben, brit milah on Shabbos, and fundamental questions of personhood in Jewish law.
This shiur provides a comprehensive examination of Gemara (גמרא) Shabbos (שבת) 136a, focusing on the fundamental question of when a newborn is considered a viable person (bar kayama). The discussion centers on the requirement that a child must live thirty days before being considered definitively alive, which has significant halachic implications for pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn) and other mitzvos. Rabbi Zweig presents the major dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot regarding this principle. Rashi maintains that every child, regardless of whether they had a full-term pregnancy, remains in doubt regarding their viability until they have survived thirty days. According to this view, the thirty-day waiting period for pidyon haben exists because we genuinely don't know if the child will survive. Tosafot, however, argues that a child from a full nine-month pregnancy is considered viable immediately upon birth, and the thirty-day requirement is merely a gezeirat hakatuv (divine decree) that applies universally, even to children whose viability is not in question. The shiur explores how this dispute affects other areas of halacha (הלכה), particularly the performance of brit milah on Shabbos. The Gemara raises a fundamental question: if we're uncertain whether a child is viable, how can we permit circumcision on Shabbos, which would constitute desecrating Shabbos for a potentially non-obligatory mitzvah (מצוה)? The Gemara's resolution is that in either case the action is permitted - if the child is viable, the mitzvah is properly performed; if not, one is merely 'cutting meat' without violating Shabbos prohibitions. The discussion extends to animals, where the parallel concept requires eight days before an animal can be used for korbanot (sacrifices). Rabbi Zweig examines various practical applications and proofs brought in the Gemara, including cases of children born in different months and the complex issue of making brachos on potentially doubtful mitzvos. The shiur also addresses the fundamental question of personhood, exploring when exactly a child achieves the legal status of a person versus remaining classified as a nefel (non-viable birth). This has implications for mourning laws, burial requirements, and other halachic obligations. Throughout the analysis, Rabbi Zweig demonstrates how this seemingly technical discussion touches on profound questions of Jewish law regarding life, viability, and the performance of mitzvos under conditions of uncertainty.
Shabbos 136a
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