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Why aren't women obligated in Hallel on Chanukah (חנוכה) if they're obligated in lighting based on 'af heim hayu b'oso hanes'? The Rambam (רמב"ם) identifies two distinct Chanukah miracles: the military victory (Hashem (ה׳)'s war through the Kohanim) and the Temple rededication with lasting oil. Women participated in the rededication like the original Mishkan, obligating them in ner Chanukah, but not in Hallel commemorating the divine military victory.
Rabbi Zweig begins with a longstanding question about the Al Hanissim prayer - why do we praise Hashem (ה׳) for 'reshaim biyad tzaddikim' and 'zeidim biyad oskei Toratecha'? The answer emerges from understanding the true nature of the Chanukah (חנוכה) miracle and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s complex presentation of the laws. The lecture analyzes a famous question on the Rambam: why doesn't he rule that women are obligated in Hallel on Chanukah if they are obligated in ner Chanukah based on 'af heim hayu b'oso hanes'? Through careful examination of Hilchos Chanukah and Hilchos Brachos, Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that the Rambam identifies two distinct miracles and corresponding obligations. The first miracle was the military victory, where the Chashmonaim (as Hashem's direct agents from Shevet Levi) overcame the Greeks - this was Hashem fighting the war directly, not a human victory. This generates obligations of Hallel, simcha, and pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle) through lighting outside. The second miracle occurred when Klal Yisrael established a malchus and rededicated the Mishkan, discovering oil that lasted eight days instead of one. This generates the core obligation of ner Chanukah. Women are obligated in ner Chanukah because they participated in the rededication of the Mishkan (similar to their role in building the original Mishkan), making this 'af eim hayu b'oso hanes.' However, women are not obligated in Hallel because the military victory was Hashem's war fought through His special legion (the Kohanim), not something in which women participated. The Rambam's language reveals this distinction: he calls ner Chanukah a 'chovah' (obligation) but describes Hallel as merely 'gomer es haHallel' (completing the Hallel) - a mitzvah (מצוה) but not an obligation. The bracha on Hallel is compared to eruv and the second reading of Megillah, both of which are mitzvos but not chovos. This understanding resolves the apparent contradictions in the Rambam's presentation and explains why he discusses the bracha question for Hallel separately from ner Chanukah, even though both are d'rabbanan.
Shabbos 21a-23a
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