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When does the principle of shavi nafsh'cha tachticha l'issur (one makes oneself liable through his own statement) apply? The shiur analyzes competing interpretations of whether this din requires expertise, intelligent opinion, or functions even without knowledge. Three approaches emerge regarding the relationship between credibility and self-imposed prohibitions.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya in Kesubos 9a dealing with the principle of shavi nafsh'cha tachticha l'issur - when a person's own statement creates a prohibition for himself. The primary case involves a man who claims to have found pesach (פסח) pasuach (evidence of his wife not being a virgin), which would normally prohibit her to him. The Gemara (גמרא) initially suggests that this principle doesn't apply when the person lacks expertise (eino baki), leading to three possible interpretations. Rabbi Zweig examines whether the conclusion (maskana) means: (1) the person must be a genuine expert (baki), (2) an intelligent opinion suffices even without expertise, or (3) the principle applies even when we know the person lacks knowledge.
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Kesubos 9a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
