No community start suggestion yet.
If someone throws an object and either they or another person catches it, why is there no liability for carrying on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur contrasts Rashi (רש"י)'s view that catching merely stops someone else's koach without creating hanachah, with Rabbeinu Hananel's chiddush that hanachah can occur 'on the person' when there's savid machshavta (intended purpose).
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya in Masechta Shabbos (שבת) dealing with the halachic principles of akira (picking up) and hanachah (placing down) in the context of carrying on Shabbos. The central question revolves around liability when someone throws an object and either the same person or another person catches it, focusing on whether this constitutes a complete melachah. The shiur begins by examining the fundamental question: if someone performs akira (the initial picking up) and hanachah (the final placing down), why wouldn't they be liable? Rabbi Zweig explores the principle that for liability, the object must land in the place where it was originally intended to go when thrown. This leads to a detailed analysis of two key scenarios from the Gemara (גמרא): 'amad b'makom' (remained in place) where the person stays where they were when the throwing began, and 'akar m'makomo' (moved from their place) where they moved to catch it.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Up Next in this Series
How can Shabbos observance atone for the idolatry of Enosh's generation? The Rambam's reading shows that generation sought God through physical intermediaries rather than direct connection. Proper Shabbos observance creates authentic divine experience that naturally displaces attraction to spiritual substitutes - like tasting real coffee exposes ersatz as meaningless.
Why does halacha forbid entering dangerous places if everything happens by Divine decree? The shiur examines the debate between Rashi and Tosfos on traveling at night, developing a fundamental distinction: Rashi holds one must avoid even deserved punishments that Hashem delays through mercy, while Tosfos holds the prohibition addresses self-inflicted harm through free will. This framework reveals how people rationalize self-destructive behavior as "hashgacha."
Why does the Gemara praise hospitality to scholars as a unique mitzvah rather than ordinary hachnasas orchim? The shiur distinguishes two mitzvahs: hachnasas orchim (providing for those in need) and connecting to talmidei chachamim (cleaving to God through scholars). Yisro's meal for the Jewish leaders wasn't charity—it was his way of bonding with those transformed by Torah, teaching that learning must fundamentally change who we are.
Masechta Shabbos
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Why does the Gemara say one Shabbos protects from Amalek while two Shabboses bring redemption? The shiur applies a principle from Kiddushin about repetition changing psychology: the first time doing anything is experimental, but the second demonstrates genuine desire. True Shabbos connection with Hashem requires moving beyond spiritual curiosity to authentic internalization.