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If someone throws an object and either they or another person catches it, why is there no liability for carrying on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur contrasts Rashi (רש"י)'s view that catching merely stops someone else's koach without creating hanachah, with Rabbeinu Hananel's chiddush that hanachah can occur 'on the person' when there's savid machshavta (intended purpose).
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya in Masechta Shabbos (שבת) dealing with the halachic principles of akira (picking up) and hanachah (placing down) in the context of carrying on Shabbos. The central question revolves around liability when someone throws an object and either the same person or another person catches it, focusing on whether this constitutes a complete melachah. The shiur begins by examining the fundamental question: if someone performs akira (the initial picking up) and hanachah (the final placing down), why wouldn't they be liable? Rabbi Zweig explores the principle that for liability, the object must land in the place where it was originally intended to go when thrown. This leads to a detailed analysis of two key scenarios from the Gemara (גמרא): 'amad b'makom' (remained in place) where the person stays where they were when the throwing began, and 'akar m'makomo' (moved from their place) where they moved to catch it.
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Masechta Shabbos
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