A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
If someone throws an object and either they or another person catches it, why is there no liability for carrying on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur contrasts Rashi (רש"י)'s view that catching merely stops someone else's koach without creating hanachah, with Rabbeinu Hananel's chiddush that hanachah can occur 'on the person' when there's savid machshavta (intended purpose).
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya in Masechta Shabbos (שבת) dealing with the halachic principles of akira (picking up) and hanachah (placing down) in the context of carrying on Shabbos. The central question revolves around liability when someone throws an object and either the same person or another person catches it, focusing on whether this constitutes a complete melachah. The shiur begins by examining the fundamental question: if someone performs akira (the initial picking up) and hanachah (the final placing down), why wouldn't they be liable? Rabbi Zweig explores the principle that for liability, the object must land in the place where it was originally intended to go when thrown. This leads to a detailed analysis of two key scenarios from the Gemara (גמרא): 'amad b'makom' (remained in place) where the person stays where they were when the throwing began, and 'akar m'makomo' (moved from their place) where they moved to catch it.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Masechta Shabbos
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Up Next in this Series
How can Shabbos observance atone for the idolatry of Enosh's generation? The Rambam's reading shows that generation sought God through physical intermediaries rather than direct connection. Proper Shabbos observance creates authentic divine experience that naturally displaces attraction to spiritual substitutes - like tasting real coffee exposes ersatz as meaningless.
Why does the Gemara say one Shabbos protects from Amalek while two Shabboses bring redemption? The shiur applies a principle from Kiddushin about repetition changing psychology: the first time doing anything is experimental, but the second demonstrates genuine desire. True Shabbos connection with Hashem requires moving beyond spiritual curiosity to authentic internalization.
Why does the Gemara pray to be 'among those who eat three meals on Shabbos' rather than simply to fulfill the mitzvah? The shiur develops that Shabbos eating means 'tasting the day itself' - mindful appreciation that connects us to Shabbos's spiritual quality. This requires discipline and community support, with three meals corresponding to distinct phases of Shabbos time.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
