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When bread gets stuck in an oven on Shabbos (שבת), may one remove it before baking completes? The shiur resolves contradictory rulings by distinguishing two separate halachos: violating 'lo sa'aseh kol melacha' occurs immediately when performing the action, while actual 'chilul Shabbos' only happens when the melacha completes.
This shiur presents a profound analysis of Masechta Shabbos (שבת) 4a regarding the case of bread that became stuck in an oven (hidbik pas b'tanur) and whether one may remove it before the baking is complete. Rabbi Zweig introduces a major machlokes (dispute) among the Acharonim (later authorities) about the fundamental nature of Shabbos prohibitions. The Gemara (גמרא) states that if bread gets stuck in an oven, one may remove it before it finishes baking, suggesting that incomplete melachos don't constitute violations. However, this creates difficulties with other melachos like zoreiah (planting) and kotzer (harvesting), where the Rishonim hold one is liable immediately upon performing the action, even if the result isn't complete. The Rashash holds that all melachos requiring duration are only complete when finished - if you interrupt the process, you avoid the prohibition entirely. Other Acharonim disagree, creating various distinctions: some say it depends whether the melacha requires subsequent human action versus natural processes (b'yedei shamayim), while others distinguish between melachos affecting the ground (avodas karka) versus food preparation. Rabbi Zweig critiques these forced distinctions as lacking proper textual foundation. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling that one may remove bread b'shogeg (accidentally) rather than b'meizid (intentionally) as the Gemara states creates additional complexity. Rabbi Zweig resolves these difficulties by proposing a fundamental distinction within Shabbos law itself. He argues there are two separate halachos: (1) the prohibition 'lo sa'aseh kol melacha' - not to perform actions that will result in melacha, which is violated immediately upon performing the action, and (2) the concept of 'chilul Shabbos' - actual desecration of Shabbos, which only occurs when the melacha is completed. According to this approach, when you put bread in an oven on Shabbos, you immediately violate the prohibition against performing melacha-causing actions. However, you only become a 'mechalel Shabbos' (Shabbos desecrator) when the bread actually finishes baking. Taking the bread out saves you from chilul Shabbos but doesn't retroactively eliminate the initial prohibition. This explains Tosafos (תוספות)' statement that 'the ma'aseh shel issur k'var nasa' - the forbidden act has already been performed. The practical ramifications are enormous: according to the Rashash, one could begin cooking five minutes before Shabbos ends since it won't finish on Shabbos, but according to Rabbi Zweig's reading, one would still be liable. This distinction also explains various nafka minas (practical differences) regarding the status of a mechalel Shabbos versus one who merely violated a Shabbos prohibition, and resolves the apparent contradiction in the Yerushalmi about actions performed on Shabbos that complete after Shabbos.
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Shabbos 4a
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Why does the Gemara say one Shabbos protects from Amalek while two Shabboses bring redemption? The shiur applies a principle from Kiddushin about repetition changing psychology: the first time doing anything is experimental, but the second demonstrates genuine desire. True Shabbos connection with Hashem requires moving beyond spiritual curiosity to authentic internalization.
