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What exactly did Chazal establish when they instituted Chanukah (חנוכה)? Rashi (רש"י) holds that lighting candles is separate from the core holiday obligations of Hallel and Al HaNissim, while the Rambam (רמב"ם) sees all three as one unified takana. This machlokes affects everything from women's obligations to whether candle-lighting fulfills the Torah (תורה) concept of pirsum nisa.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Shabbos (שבת) 21b, focusing on the fundamental question of 'Mai Chanukah (חנוכה)' and examining the core disagreement between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding the nature of Chanukah's mitzvos. The Gemara (גמרא) asks what is Chanukah, referring to the eight days listed in Megillas Taanis when fasting is prohibited due to miracles that occurred. According to Rashi's interpretation, the Gemara's question and answer have nothing to do with lighting candles (hadlakas nerot). Instead, Mai Chanukah refers to establishing these eight days as a time when fasting is forbidden, with the obligations of saying Hallel and reciting Al HaNissim (hodaah). Rashi views lighting Chanukah candles as a completely separate halachic obligation, unconnected to the core holiday discussed in our Gemara. This creates what the Bach calls a significant difficulty - how could the Gemara discuss Chanukah without mentioning the lighting of candles, which seems so central to the holiday? The Rambam, however, interprets the Gemara differently. He understands that when Chazal established Chanukah, they instituted three interconnected obligations: simcha (joy), Hallel, and hadlakas nerot (lighting candles). According to the Rambam, all three elements are part of one unified takana established because of the miracle, making lighting candles an integral part of Mai Chanukah rather than a separate obligation. Rabbi Zweig explores the implications of this debate through analysis of a related Gemara in Rosh Hashanah discussing whether Megillas Taanis was nullified after the destruction of the Temple. The Gemara there states that Chanukah was not nullified because of 'pirsum nisa' (publicizing the miracle). Tosafos (תוספות) argues that this proves lighting candles and the holiday aspects of Chanukah are separate - the holiday could be nullified while the candle-lighting obligation remains. The Rashba strongly disagrees, arguing that the Gemara clearly connects the mitzvah (מצוה) to the holiday. Rabbi Zweig suggests that according to the Rambam's reading, pirsum nisa might refer specifically to the obligation of lighting candles as a fulfillment of the Torah (תורה)-level concept of publicizing miracles, making it too significant to nullify. The shiur also examines the obligation of women in Chanukah mitzvos. The Gemara states that women are obligated in ner Chanukah because 'af hein hayu b'oso hanes' (they too were part of that miracle). According to Rashi's approach, where lighting candles is separate from the core holiday obligations, women would be obligated in lighting but potentially exempt from Hallel (as it would be considered a time-bound positive commandment). According to the Rambam's unified approach, women's obligation in one aspect of Chanukah would extend to all aspects. Throughout the analysis, Rabbi Zweig demonstrates how these different interpretations affect our understanding of fundamental concepts in hilchos Chanukah, including the nature of the miracle being commemorated, the relationship between different Chanukah observances, and the scope of various groups' obligations in the mitzvos of the holiday.
Shabbos 21b
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