A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
When does a woman become prohibited to her husband after adultery? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s progression from requiring kinuy v'stira to accepting eidim, and whether pesach (פסח) pasuach (the husband's testimony) should be equivalent to two witnesses.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of Kesubos 9a, focusing on the positions of Tosfos and the Ritva regarding the case of pesach (פסח) pasuach and the requirement of kinuy v'stira for prohibiting a woman to her husband. Rabbi Zweig begins by outlining the Gemara (גמרא)'s fundamental question: Rav Eliezer states that without kinuy v'stira there is no prohibition, yet this seems contradictory since pesach pasuach (where the husband witnesses his wife's infidelity) should also create a prohibition based on the principle of pesach pasuach. The shiur examines Tosfos's approach, which distinguishes between different types of testimony. According to Tosfos, the husband's sole testimony about witnessing his wife's adultery is insufficient because it lacks the formal witness structure required for halachic validity. Tosfos maintains that two witnesses seeing the adultery would indeed prohibit the woman to her husband, but the husband's individual testimony, even of direct observation, does not constitute proper eidus. This creates a framework where kinuy v'stira serves as an alternative mechanism that can establish prohibition even without the standard two-witness requirement.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 9a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
