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When does a woman become prohibited to her husband after adultery? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s progression from requiring kinuy v'stira to accepting eidim, and whether pesach (פסח) pasuach (the husband's testimony) should be equivalent to two witnesses.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of Kesubos 9a, focusing on the positions of Tosfos and the Ritva regarding the case of pesach (פסח) pasuach and the requirement of kinuy v'stira for prohibiting a woman to her husband. Rabbi Zweig begins by outlining the Gemara (גמרא)'s fundamental question: Rav Eliezer states that without kinuy v'stira there is no prohibition, yet this seems contradictory since pesach pasuach (where the husband witnesses his wife's infidelity) should also create a prohibition based on the principle of pesach pasuach. The shiur examines Tosfos's approach, which distinguishes between different types of testimony. According to Tosfos, the husband's sole testimony about witnessing his wife's adultery is insufficient because it lacks the formal witness structure required for halachic validity. Tosfos maintains that two witnesses seeing the adultery would indeed prohibit the woman to her husband, but the husband's individual testimony, even of direct observation, does not constitute proper eidus. This creates a framework where kinuy v'stira serves as an alternative mechanism that can establish prohibition even without the standard two-witness requirement.
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Kesubos 9a
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