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When two people share a Shabbos (שבת) melacha - one lifting, another placing down - has either person fully violated? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s unusual organization in Hilchos Shabbos reveals a chiddush that in many such cases, no complete melacha occurs at all. This reframes both the liability and the lifnei iver implications when enabling another's partial violation.
This advanced shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of Masechta Shabbos (שבת) 3a, focusing on the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s distinctive approach to understanding shared melachos (forbidden labors) on Shabbos and their relationship to the principle of lifnei iver. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Rambam's seemingly unusual organization in Hilchos Shabbos, Perek 13, halachos 5-7, questioning why the Rambam deviates from the standard order of the Mishna and inserts seemingly irrelevant halachos in the middle of his discussion. The core issue centers on cases where two people share in performing a melacha - one doing the akira (lifting) and another doing the hanachah (placing down). The shiur explores the fundamental question of whether such cases constitute a complete violation by one person or a shared violation requiring both parties. Rabbi Zweig demonstrates how the Rambam reads the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of 'osav l'dechi ufchatus' (close to becoming liable for a sin offering) as referring not to traditional cases of shnayim she'asu (two people performing together), but rather to situations where one person performs most of a melacha while the other party remains largely passive. The analysis reveals that according to the Rambam's interpretation, in many cases discussed in the Mishna, there is actually no complete melacha performed at all - neither person completes all the required elements of hotza'ah (carrying out). This leads to a novel understanding of why certain cases are counted as d'oraita violations while others are not. The shiur concludes by examining how this interpretation affects our understanding of lifnei iver and the responsibility one bears when enabling another's potential violation, even in cases of shared action.
Shabbos 3a
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