A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
When can we believe a woman who says her child's father was kosher? The Rambam (רמב"ם) requires two statistical majorities to permit her to marry a kohen but only her testimony for the child's legitimacy. The shiur resolves this apparent contradiction through a novel understanding of when halachic decisions are made during pregnancy versus after birth.
This shiur analyzes a complex passage in Rambam (רמב"ם)'s Hilchos Issurei Biah dealing with when a woman is believed regarding the identity of her child's father. The Rambam rules that if witnesses see a single woman engaging in relations and she claims it was with a kosher man, she is believed. However, there appears to be a contradiction between two sections of the Rambam's code. In Perek 9, Halacha (הלכה) 16, the Rambam states that even if there is a majority of disqualified men in the area, the woman is believed when she says the father was kosher, and the child may marry into regular Jewish families. However, in Perek 18, the Rambam requires not only her testimony but also two statistical majorities (rov) supporting her claim before she can marry a kohen - both that the majority of people in the city are kosher, and that the majority of people who frequent the marketplace are kosher.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 13a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
