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When can we believe a woman who says her child's father was kosher? The Rambam (רמב"ם) requires two statistical majorities to permit her to marry a kohen but only her testimony for the child's legitimacy. The shiur resolves this apparent contradiction through a novel understanding of when halachic decisions are made during pregnancy versus after birth.
This shiur analyzes a complex passage in Rambam (רמב"ם)'s Hilchos Issurei Biah dealing with when a woman is believed regarding the identity of her child's father. The Rambam rules that if witnesses see a single woman engaging in relations and she claims it was with a kosher man, she is believed. However, there appears to be a contradiction between two sections of the Rambam's code. In Perek 9, Halacha (הלכה) 16, the Rambam states that even if there is a majority of disqualified men in the area, the woman is believed when she says the father was kosher, and the child may marry into regular Jewish families. However, in Perek 18, the Rambam requires not only her testimony but also two statistical majorities (rov) supporting her claim before she can marry a kohen - both that the majority of people in the city are kosher, and that the majority of people who frequent the marketplace are kosher.
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Kesubos 13a
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
