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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) accept a mother's testimony about her child's lineage for some purposes but not others? The shiur develops the Rava Magid's distinction that her credibility depends on whether the prohibition is d'oraisa or d'rabbanan, and explores how cheskas eim mahani lebas only applies to disqualifications derived from the mother herself.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Kesubos 13b regarding when a mother is believed about her child's lineage, particularly focusing on the different applications for marriage to a kohen versus marriage to a regular Jew. The central question is why the Rambam (רמב"ם) doesn't codify certain halachos mentioned in the Gemara (גמרא) about believing a mother's testimony. The Pischa Basra (Rava Magid) provides a fundamental distinction: the mother is only believed regarding prohibitions that are d'rabbanan in nature. When dealing with a safek mamzer (doubtful illegitimate child), since safek mamzer is treated leniently as a d'rabbanan issue for marriage to regular Jews, the mother's testimony is accepted. However, for marriage to a kohen, where additional restrictions apply that may be d'oraisa in nature, her testimony becomes insufficient.
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Kesubos 13b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
