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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) accept a mother's testimony about her child's lineage for some purposes but not others? The shiur develops the Rava Magid's distinction that her credibility depends on whether the prohibition is d'oraisa or d'rabbanan, and explores how cheskas eim mahani lebas only applies to disqualifications derived from the mother herself.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Kesubos 13b regarding when a mother is believed about her child's lineage, particularly focusing on the different applications for marriage to a kohen versus marriage to a regular Jew. The central question is why the Rambam (רמב"ם) doesn't codify certain halachos mentioned in the Gemara (גמרא) about believing a mother's testimony. The Pischa Basra (Rava Magid) provides a fundamental distinction: the mother is only believed regarding prohibitions that are d'rabbanan in nature. When dealing with a safek mamzer (doubtful illegitimate child), since safek mamzer is treated leniently as a d'rabbanan issue for marriage to regular Jews, the mother's testimony is accepted. However, for marriage to a kohen, where additional restrictions apply that may be d'oraisa in nature, her testimony becomes insufficient.
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Kesubos 13b
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