No community start suggestion yet.
Does the community have to provide arba kosos for the poor, and must individuals sacrifice everything to obtain them? The Rashbam establishes dual obligations - both communal provision and individual responsibility to sell clothing or borrow if necessary. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s parallel ruling on Chanukah (חנוכה) oil reveals that certain mitzvos involving pirsumei nisa override normal poverty exemptions.
This shiur provides an in-depth examination of Pesachim 108ab, focusing on the Mishna's statement "ולא יפחסו לו מארבע כוסות של יין" (they should not give him less than four cups of wine). Rabbi Zweig analyzes the fundamental disagreement among the Rishonim regarding the obligations this creates for both the community and the individual. Rashi (רש"י) introduces the concept that arba kosos corresponds to the four expressions of redemption (ארבע לשונות גאולה), but then presents an alternative source based on Pharaoh's cup. This inconsistency leads to the conclusion that the obligation of "לא יפחסו לו" only applies when the source is the four expressions of redemption, not when derived from Pharaoh's cup. The Rashbam takes a more stringent position, establishing two distinct obligations: first, that the gaboyei tzedakah (charity administrators) must provide the four cups, and second, that if they fail to do so, the individual must sell his clothing, borrow money, or hire himself out to fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה). This represents a significant chiddush (novel insight) in Jewish law. Tosafos (תוספות) offers a more lenient interpretation, suggesting that "לא יפחסו לו" merely permits the poor person to accept charity for this purpose without being overly stringent about avoiding such assistance. The shiur then transitions to examining the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of this halacha (הלכה), which presents it as two separate laws: first, that one cannot have fewer than four cups (ein poskin mehem), and second, that charity must be provided (lo yifchesu lo me'arba kosos). This formulation raises questions about the relationship between the mitzvah's obligatory nature and the right to receive charitable assistance. The analysis extends to the Rambam's parallel discussion in Hilchos Chanukah (חנוכה), where he writes that even one who has nothing to eat except from charity must borrow or sell his garment to obtain oil for the Chanukah lights. Notably, the Rambam here omits any mention of communal obligation to provide assistance, focusing solely on individual responsibility. The Magid Mishneh attempts to reconcile these seemingly disparate halachos by suggesting that the principle can be derived from the arba kosos case - that poverty does not exempt one from certain mitzvos, particularly those involving pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle). He argues that while most rabbinical mitzvos are waived for those who cannot afford them (based on the principle of not spending more than a fifth of one's money on mitzvos), arba kosos is an exception due to its pirsumei nisa aspect. The shiur concludes with several challenging questions about the Rambam's methodology and consistency. If the obligation to go out and beg applies to Chanukah based on the precedent of arba kosos, why doesn't the Rambam apply this same logic consistently across all similar cases? Furthermore, the Rambam's treatment of Shabbos (שבת) candles presents another puzzle - he requires one to borrow and beg for Shabbos lights as part of oneg Shabbos, but this seems to contradict the hierarchy established elsewhere that places shalom bayis (and thus Shabbos lights) above even pirsumei nisa. These inconsistencies highlight the complexity of determining when poverty exempts one from mitzvah observance and when it does not, leaving several fundamental questions unresolved about the theoretical underpinnings of these important halachic obligations.
Pesachim 108ab
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
