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Does the community have to provide arba kosos for the poor, and must individuals sacrifice everything to obtain them? The Rashbam establishes dual obligations - both communal provision and individual responsibility to sell clothing or borrow if necessary. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s parallel ruling on Chanukah (חנוכה) oil reveals that certain mitzvos involving pirsumei nisa override normal poverty exemptions.
This shiur provides an in-depth examination of Pesachim 108ab, focusing on the Mishna's statement "ולא יפחסו לו מארבע כוסות של יין" (they should not give him less than four cups of wine). Rabbi Zweig analyzes the fundamental disagreement among the Rishonim regarding the obligations this creates for both the community and the individual. Rashi (רש"י) introduces the concept that arba kosos corresponds to the four expressions of redemption (ארבע לשונות גאולה), but then presents an alternative source based on Pharaoh's cup. This inconsistency leads to the conclusion that the obligation of "לא יפחסו לו" only applies when the source is the four expressions of redemption, not when derived from Pharaoh's cup. The Rashbam takes a more stringent position, establishing two distinct obligations: first, that the gaboyei tzedakah (charity administrators) must provide the four cups, and second, that if they fail to do so, the individual must sell his clothing, borrow money, or hire himself out to fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה). This represents a significant chiddush (novel insight) in Jewish law. Tosafos (תוספות) offers a more lenient interpretation, suggesting that "לא יפחסו לו" merely permits the poor person to accept charity for this purpose without being overly stringent about avoiding such assistance. The shiur then transitions to examining the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of this halacha (הלכה), which presents it as two separate laws: first, that one cannot have fewer than four cups (ein poskin mehem), and second, that charity must be provided (lo yifchesu lo me'arba kosos). This formulation raises questions about the relationship between the mitzvah's obligatory nature and the right to receive charitable assistance. The analysis extends to the Rambam's parallel discussion in Hilchos Chanukah (חנוכה), where he writes that even one who has nothing to eat except from charity must borrow or sell his garment to obtain oil for the Chanukah lights. Notably, the Rambam here omits any mention of communal obligation to provide assistance, focusing solely on individual responsibility. The Magid Mishneh attempts to reconcile these seemingly disparate halachos by suggesting that the principle can be derived from the arba kosos case - that poverty does not exempt one from certain mitzvos, particularly those involving pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle). He argues that while most rabbinical mitzvos are waived for those who cannot afford them (based on the principle of not spending more than a fifth of one's money on mitzvos), arba kosos is an exception due to its pirsumei nisa aspect. The shiur concludes with several challenging questions about the Rambam's methodology and consistency. If the obligation to go out and beg applies to Chanukah based on the precedent of arba kosos, why doesn't the Rambam apply this same logic consistently across all similar cases? Furthermore, the Rambam's treatment of Shabbos (שבת) candles presents another puzzle - he requires one to borrow and beg for Shabbos lights as part of oneg Shabbos, but this seems to contradict the hierarchy established elsewhere that places shalom bayis (and thus Shabbos lights) above even pirsumei nisa. These inconsistencies highlight the complexity of determining when poverty exempts one from mitzvah observance and when it does not, leaving several fundamental questions unresolved about the theoretical underpinnings of these important halachic obligations.
Pesachim 108ab
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