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When must one borrow money for mitzvos, given that the Gemara (גמרא) says both that one shouldn't impoverish oneself and that even poor people must spend for certain mitzvos? The Rama Magid distinguishes between personal mitzvos (where charity doesn't provide money) and pirsumei nisa like Chanukah (חנוכה) (where one may borrow because the goal is bringing God's presence into the world, not personal fulfillment).
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of one of the most challenging sugyos in halacha (הלכה) - the question of when one is obligated to spend money or even borrow for mitzvos. Rabbi Zweig begins by acknowledging the difficulty of this sugya, noting that even the Biur Halacha of the past hundred years doesn't provide clear answers. The fundamental problem emerges from conflicting Talmudic sources: the Gemara (גמרא) in Bava Kamma establishes that one cannot be obligated to impoverish oneself for mitzvos, and based on the Gemara in Sotah, one should not give more than a fifth (chomesh) of one's money for mitzvos. However, the Gemara in Kiddushin seems to contradict this by stating that for pidyon haben and aliyah laregel, even a poor person is obligated to spend money. The shiur explores various approaches to resolve this contradiction, ultimately focusing on the Rama Magid's innovative interpretation. According to the Rama Magid, there is a fundamental distinction between regular mitzvos and pirsumei nisa (publicizing miracles). For regular mitzvos, charity organizations don't provide money - they only provide food. The principle is that if Hashem (ה׳) gave you money, you do mitzvos from your money; if you don't have money, you don't do mitzvos. However, pirsumei nisa is different - it's not about personal mitzvah (מצוה) fulfillment but about creating an objective presence of God in the world. For this purpose, one may be required to ask for charity or even sell clothing. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling about Chanukah (חנוכה) candles taking precedence over kiddush wine is explained through this framework - Chanukah represents a greater level of pirsumei nisa because it brings God's presence not just to one's home but to the world. The concept of shalom bayis is presented as the highest level of God's presence, as evidenced by the principle that Hashem's name may be erased for the sake of peace between husband and wife. The shiur also addresses the Rambam's statement about Shabbos (שבת) candles, explaining that when one has collected charity money and must choose between food and candles, candles should be chosen because they also provide oneg (pleasure) similar to food, while simultaneously creating God's presence through shalom bayis. The analysis extends to ma'aser shekel, showing that charity provides money for the functioning of the Beis Hamikdash (God's presence in the world) but not for individual mitzvos. Regarding pidyon haben, the shiur suggests it's not a mitzvah per se but a monetary obligation (chov), which explains why the poor must find money for it. The Yerushalmi's statement about kibud av v'em is reinterpreted - it's not about spending money for mitzvos but about saving one's father from the embarrassment of begging by doing the begging oneself.
Pesachim 108ab
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